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Between two and three in the afternoon on 12 January 1640, Admiral Wil-
lem Corneliszoon Loos signalled to the Dutch fleet on the Brazilian coast 
off Paraíba to attack the Luso-Spanish armada dispatched by King Philip IV 
to recapture Pernambuco.1 Thus started the first of the four confrontations 
between 12 and 17 January that became known as the 1640 Naval Battle of 
Paraíba. On both sides, the numbers of ships and men involved were con-
siderable. The armada under Fernando Mascarenhas, Count of Torre, com-
prised 66 ships and 5,000 infantry soldiers, and was undoubtedly the largest 
fleet the Spanish monarchy had ever assembled in Brazilian waters. The 
Dutch in turn had 41 vessels and 2,800 men. From a military perspective, 
the battle was inconclusive since neither fleet was able to destroy the other. 
In the end, however, the Dutch fleet was able to drive away the armada and 
the status quo ante bellum consequently prevailed, with the north-eastern 
shores of Brazil remaining in Dutch hands. Not surprisingly, this outcome 
was seen as a victory and depicted as such by the Dutch painter Frans Post 
in the four engravings dedicated to this episode.2 For the Luso-Spanish, on 
the other hand, the battle was clearly perceived as a defeat since the arma-
da’s ultimate goal of recapturing Pernambuco was not achieved.
 Over the years the 1640 naval battle has attracted the attention of sever-
al historians, including F.A. Varnhagen, H. Wätjen and J.C. Warnsinck, who 
1 The prefix ‘Luso’ means ‘Portuguese’, after the Roman province of Lusitania, approximately 
corresponding to modern Portugal.
2 The four engravings are included in C. Barlaeus, Rerum per octennium in Brasilia et alibi ges-
tarum, sub praefectura illustrissimi comitis I. Mauritii, Nassoviae, etc. (Amsterdam 1647). Hereafter, 
we use the following edition, História dos feitos recentemente praticados durante oito anos no 
Brasil e noutras partes sob o governo do illustrissimo João Maurício conde de Nassau, etc. (Rio de 
Janeiro 1940).
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made extensive use of Dutch sources.3 By combining the Dutch and Portu-
guese accounts, C.R. Boxer and, more recently, M.J. Guedes shed new light 
on the episode.4 The Portuguese material to which Boxer drew attention 
included the original papers of Fernando Mascarenhas, the commander in-
chief of the armada, although Boxer was not able to make extensive use of 
them. These papers are gathered in four voluminous codices and record 
events concerning the armada between April 1638 and October 1640. Writ-
ten in Portuguese and Spanish, they comprise various documents, includ-
ing correspondence exchanged between Fernando Mascarenhas and King 
Philip IV, the Count-Duke of Olivares (his favourite minister, or valido), the 
Councils of Portugal and Castile and the high officers of the armada, as well 
as instructions, reports, and minutes of meetings of the Council of Cap-
tains. The codices are currently held in Brazilian and Portuguese archives 
and were first published in 2001 and 2002.5
 The documents in these codices constitute the bedrock of this article 
which focuses on the armada leaders’ perceptions of their opponent during 
their sojourn in Brazil, a topic still insufficiently explored in the literature. 
Given the goal of the expedition, gathering information on the Dutch mil-
itary and naval power was crucial for defining a strategy to oust them from 
Pernambuco. How did the armada leaders acquire intelligence? How reli-
able was it when cross-checked against other sources, and to what extent 
did the outcome of the battle depend on it?
 This paper comprises three parts. The first one places the armada in the 
political context of the Dutch Republic being at odds with the Spanish mon-
archy and analyses the chain of events from the outfitting of the ships in 
Iberia until their arrival off the coast of Pernambuco in January 1639. The 
second part covers the ten months preceding the battle and examines the 
steps taken by the military commanders of the armada to gather intelligence 
3 F.A. Varnhagen, História das Lutas com os Hollandezes no Brazil (Lisbon 1872). Varnhagen 
and other Portuguese-speaking historians used Dutch sources gathered in the nineteenth cen-
tury by Brazilian diplomats. Some of these were translated and published, including the letters 
written by Johan Maurits von Nassau-Siegen as published as ‘Cartas Nassovianas, 1637-1646’ in: 
Revista do Instituto Arqueológico e Geográfico Pernambucano, vol. X, 56, 23-52; XII, 69, 533-555. H. 
Wätjen, Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien. Ein Kapitel aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. 
Jahrhunderts (The Hague and Gotha 1921), later translated into Portuguese and published as O 
Domínio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil (São Paulo 1938); J.C.M. Warnsinck, ‘Een mislukte aanslag op 
Nederlandsch Brazilië’, Van vlootvoogden en Zeeslagen (Amsterdam 1940) 129-159.
4 C.R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654 (Oxford 1957); M.J. Guedes, História Naval Brasileira, 
vol. II, part 1A (Rio de Janeiro 1990).
5 J.P. Salvado and S. Münch Miranda (eds.), Cartas do 1.º Conde da Torre, 4 vols. (Lisbon 2001-
2002) (hereafter CCT).
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and prepare for the confrontation. The third part follows the events taking 
place from November 1639, when the armada set sail from Bahia aiming to 
recover Pernambuco, until its dispersal and ultimate failure in early 1640.
Third Luso-Spanish armada for the restoration of Pernambuco
In 1630, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) occupied Olinda, the seat of 
Pernambuco, the richest sugar producing area in north-east Brazil, as part 
of its plan to extend the war against Spain into the Atlantic. Alarmed by the 
news, King Philip IV, who also ruled over Portugal through a dynastic union, 
immediately sent an armada to reconquer Olinda. In May 1631, Admiral An-
tonio de Oquendo left Lisbon with instructions to wrest Pernambuco from 
Dutch control and then to head for Havana to escort the Spanish Treasure 
Fleet. As this armada failed to fulfil its main mission, a second fleet was 
dispatched in 1635. By then, however, the Dutch had further strengthened 
their position in the north-east of Brazil by taking Itamaracá, Paraíba and 
Rio Grande do Norte, while also successfully establishing new territorial 
bases in Aruba and Curaçao and thus threatening the Spanish Silver Fleet’s 
route in the Caribbean.6 
The conquest of the Rio Grande in Brazil, 1633. Anonymous engraving, c. 1650. 
Collection Rijksmuseum Amsterdam
6 H. den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen 1994).
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This second armada also failed in its attempt to oust the Dutch from Per-
nambuco, thus forcing Madrid to organise a third expedition in late 1635. 
The appointment of this armada’s commander-in-chief became protract-
ed and occupied the royal court throughout 1636 and 1637. This time, the 
Count-Duke of Olivares sought greater commitment from Portugal and in-
sisted that the command should be given to a Portuguese nobleman.7 Fer-
nando Mascarenhas, a former governor of Ceuta and Tangiers, was eventu-
ally appointed governor-general of Brazil and given supreme command of 
a combined Luso-Spanish armada.8 The armada actually consisted of two 
fleets, a Portuguese and a Spanish one, with each fleet’s ships being outfit-
ted in Lisbon and Cadiz respectively.
 The first few months of 1638 saw intense activity in the Portuguese royal 
shipyard in Lisbon, where 23 ships were being equipped under the Count 
of Torre’s supervision. The fleet’s departure was systematically delayed by 
difficulties in food and armament provisioning, as well as in recruiting sea-
men and soldiers.9 The Spanish fleet also had to deal with several contin-
gencies in Cadiz, and these delayed its setting sail for Lisbon, where the 
armada was supposed to assemble before heading for Brazil.
 While the Spanish monarchy was organising this armada, Dutch Brazil 
had time to consolidate further. On 23 January 1637 Johan Maurits van Nas-
sau-Siegen, who was appointed Governor-, Captain-, and Admiral-general 
of Dutch Brazil, arrived in Recife. He went on to incorporate other terri-
tories into the WIC so that, by 1638, its jurisdiction ranged from the São 
Francisco River in the south to Ceará in the north. The success of these en-
deavours encouraged the governor to attempt to seize Salvador, which was 
considered the key for complete control over Portuguese America. In April 
1638, 30 ships carrying 3,600 soldiers and 1,000 Indians besieged Salvador, 
but the city resisted and the siege was lifted in late May.10 By the time this 
news reached Madrid, the war was clearly starting to spread across Brazil 
and steps were taken to speed up the outfitting of the third armada.
 In Lisbon, the Count of Torre received instructions to depart immedi-
ately. The Portuguese fleet was told to head for the island of Santiago (Cape 
Verde) and await the arrival of the Spanish fleet. Once the two fleets were 
7 The more experienced Spanish admirals, Antonio de Oquendo and Lopo de Hoces, were also 
mobilised to command another armada to be sent to the North Sea. This was defeated at Downs 
on 21 October 1639. See J.H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline 
(New Haven 1986) 548-550.
8 CCT, vol. I , 477.
9 CCT, vol. II, 39-45.
10 Wätjen, O domínio, 96, 142-143, 160-163; Boxer, The Dutch, 68-69, 87.
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united, they were to head straight for Recife and put the city under attack. 
Despite the pressure exerted by Philip IV, the Portuguese fleet did not set 
sail until early September. The fleet comprised galleons and other smaller 
vessels carrying nearly 5,000 men. However, the urgency surrounding its 
departure meant it was insufficiently fitted out.11
 The voyage was ill-fated, with nearly 400 of the crew and soldiers dy-
ing of malaria and 1,200 falling ill during the three weeks that the fleet was 
anchored off the island of Santiago.12 The Spanish fleet finally arrived at 
Santiago on 5 November, from where the combined armada of 38 vessels 
set sail.13 However, men on board continued to die. By the time the fleet 
reached the coastal waters of Recife in early January 1639, an official report 
stated almost 1,200 men to be dead and 900 ill. The toll that crossing the 
Atlantic took also included five stray or lost ships and insufficient or rotten 
provisions. Given the seriousness of the situation, Fernando Mascarenhas 
concluded that the conditions were not right for attacking Recife imme-
diately. Against the advice of his senior officers, he decided to proceed to 
Salvador to recover from the misfortunes of the voyage and, on 17 January, 
the armada anchored in the Bay of All Saints.14 Over the following months, 
the Luso-Spanish in Salvador and the Dutch in Recife prepared for battle, 
while also striving to gather intelligence on their opponent’s plans.
Recife and Salvador: preparing for battle 
The arrival of the armada off Recife was not a complete surprise for the gov-
ernment of Dutch Brazil. The States-General and WIC had known at least 
since 1637 that Philip IV was preparing a third expedition to recapture Per-
nambuco. According to rumours, the Luso-Spanish were assembling a fleet 
of numerous warships with between 11,000 and 12,000 troops. Apprehen-
sive at the prospect of a military confrontation of such scale, Johan Maurits 
informed the Heeren XIX (the governing body of the WIC) as early as July 
1638 that he needed a permanent army of 7,000 men.15 Yet by the time the 
armada surged, Dutch Brazil was at its weakest and reliant on 3,230 soldiers, 
23 vessels and 930 sailors for its defence.16 Reinforcements did not arrive 
11 Guedes, História Naval, 237-241.
12 CCT, vol. IV, 56-59.
13 Boxer refers to 46 vessels (The Dutch, 89).
14 CCT, vol. I 139, 157; 203-205; Idem vol. IV, 79-89.
15 Boxer, The Dutch, 86; Wätjen, O domínio, 163.
16 Guedes, História Naval, 256-257.
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until March 1639, in the form of seven ships and 1,200 men under the com-
mand of Krzysztof Arciszewski.17 
 Over the following months, the Count of Nassau-Siegen focused on or-
ganising the naval and terrestrial defence of New Holland, while also seek-
ing to monitor his opponent’s activities. Yachts were routinely dispatched 
to cruise off Bahia for that purpose. The Dutch were thus able to obtain up-
dated news by capturing Luso-Brazilian fishermen or intercepting caravels 
carrying correspondence to the royal court and, as we shall see, these ac-
tions provided Johan Maurits in May 1639 with some valuable information.
 In Bahia, meanwhile, the Count of Torre had almost no information 
on the Dutch forces and their movements, particularly in the first few 
months of 1639. In an attempt to overcome this problem, Fernando Mas-
carenhas dispatched captain André Vidal de Negreiros to the hinterland 
of Pernambuco in early May. The instructions given to Vidal on the goals 
of his mission were very clear. By drawing on feelings of solidarity among 
Luso-Brazilians, he was to find out more about the opponent’s plans, its 
troop numbers (including Indians) and distribution across the forts, new 
fortifications built in recent months and the ships it possessed. He was also 
instructed to gather information about the availability of supplies in Recife 
and in the field, including the number of cattle, as this was decisive for 
provisioning the infantry that Mascarenhas planned to disembark for the 
land attack. Vidal was told to send weekly reports to Salvador and to stay 
in hiding in the hinterland until the armada arrived.18 Fortunately for the 
Count of Torre, Vidal’s departure coincided with the arrival of captain João 
de Magalhães, who provided the first and much needed updated news on 
the Dutch.
 Following a decision by the former governor of Brazil, João de Magalhães 
had been living undercover in Pernambuco for several months. He had 
been dispatched to Dutch territory, probably in December 1638, with in-
structions to await the arrival of the armada, which by then was expected 
to attack Recife immediately. Realising that this project had failed, he re-
turned to Salvador, but not before gathering information on the military 
and naval power of the Dutch. Upon his return in mid-May, he reported 
how “the enemy was fortified across the marina and in many villages and 
sugar mills”.19 Magalhães was not far from the truth in his account as the de-
17 CTT, vol. II 214. Eight ships and 1,200 men according to Boxer (The Dutch, 90) and 1,600 men 
according to Wätjen, O domínio, 164-165.
18 CCT, vol. II, 321-323.
19 CCT, vol. II, 214.
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fensive complex of Dutch Brazil encompassed 24 forts, villages and fortified 
sugar mills, each with a military garrison.20 According to Magalhães, the 
Dutch had 5,500 soldiers distributed across this defensive system. Among 
these he highlighted the contingent of 1,500 men stationed at the strategic 
defence location of Serinhaém (south of Recife). Magalhães’ assessment 
did not include Arciszewski’s reinforcements, which, he stated, comprised 
only 400 men. Thus Dutch Brazil had for its defence a total of 5,900 soldiers, 
excluding Amerindians and African troops.21
 The estimate by Magalhães differed from the 3,230 soldiers reported to 
the WIC by Johan Maurits in February that year, but was close to Barlaeus’ 
assessment of around 5,600 for the same period. It is not easy to explain 
this discrepancy, although the governor of New Holland probably used re-
strictive criteria and so counted only the soldiers physically fit for combat. 
The information provided by Magalhães nevertheless strengthened the no-
tion that comparable numbers of soldiers had to be mobilised for terrestri-
al fighting. Regarding the naval power of the Dutch, Magalhães’ testimony 
matches the information conveyed by the other available sources, namely 
thirty ships, including the seven vessels brought by Arciszewski.22
 Despite the value of the news brought by Magalhães, André Vidal con-
tinued on his mission because the Count of Torre needed a permanent set 
of eyes and ears in Dutch territory. With a few other men, therefore, Vidal 
travelled by boat to Porto Calvo (Alagoas). This mission initially resulted 
in the capture of two Dutchmen, who were sent back to Bahia in the same 
boat. From these prisoners, the Count of Torre learned that Johan Mau-
rits was preparing to dispatch a fleet, although its mission was uncertain. 
Three weeks later, a report from Vidal dated 1 June confirmed that Admiral 
Willem Loos had left Recife with 20 vessels and 700 men.23 By then, the Lu-
so-Spanish had realised what the fleet was seeking to achieve. A group of 
fishermen captured off Salvador had informed the Dutch that the armada’s 
strength had been diminished as several galleons were careening off the 
island of Itaparica (Bay of All Saints). Johan Maurits immediately took this 
opportunity to further weaken his opponent’s naval power by dispatching 
the aforementioned fleet, which also comprised eight fire-ships, in May to 
set light to the beached and, therefore, vulnerable galleons.24
20 Barlaeus, História dos Feitos, 146.
21 CCT, vol. I, 373.
22 CCT, vol. II 213-215; Boxer, The Dutch, 91; Guedes, História Naval, 263.
23 Barlaeus mentions 18 ships, História dos Feitos, 166.
24 CCT, vol. I, 261 and 266.
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Portrait of Johan Maurits van Nassau Siegen. Design drawing of an engraving by 
Cornelis van Dalen (II), based on a painting of Govert Flinck, 1658.
Collection Rijksmuseum Amsterdam
For the Luso-Spanish commanders, Vidal’s news could not have been more 
opportune. Vigilance over the Bay of Salvador was immediately strength-
ened, thus removing any chance of a surprise attack by the Dutch. Al-
though such an attack did not ultimately take place, the Dutch fleet cap-
tured a caravel while cruising off the Bay of All Saints. As well as carrying 
sugar crates, this caravel was also taking letters from the Count of Torre and 
other high officers to Philip IV and Count-duke Olivares. From this corre-
spondence, the Count of Nassau-Siegen obtained detailed news about the 
Luso-Spanish military and naval contingents and discovered that 7,000 re-
inforcements from the Azores were expected. This information was imme-
diately conveyed to the Heeren XIX, while Johan Maurits once again availed 
himself of the opportunity to call for reinforcements.25 
25 Barleus, História dos Feitos, 166; Guedes, História Naval, 263.
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 At Bahia, in the meantime, all that remained to be done was to finish 
outfitting the armada. Intense preparations were underway in late 1639 in 
an effort to resolve various problems. The departure was repeatedly delayed, 
however, by a lack of funds, raw materials and intermediate goods to outfit 
the ships, as well as by insufficient food supplies. The reinforcements from 
the Azores, comprising 18 ships, as well as armaments, ammunition and 
supplies, arrived in October 1639. However, only 1,120 men, instead of the 
promised 7,000, arrived, and that must have disappointed Mascarenhas.26 
By that time, the galleons had finally been careened and the field artillery 
prepared, while the Count of Torre also managed to freight 36 merchant 
ships engaged in the sugar trade to transport the infantry.
 As the departure date approached, Captain António Filipe Camarão 
and his Amerindian troops were sent to the hinterland of Pernambuco with 
instructions to take up positions on the ground so as to put pressure on the 
Dutch as soon as the infantry landed. The Luso-Spanish strategy for recon-
quering Pernambuco was twofold: firstly, a field campaign, whereby infan-
trymen would disembark and march on Recife so as to confine the Dutch to 
the main fortifications and cut the city off from inland food supplies, while 
secondly the armada was instructed to destroy the Dutch fleet and lay siege 
to Recife.27 Setting this two-pronged plan in motion proved, however, to be 
a very difficult task.
Naval battle of 1640
The armada finally set sail from Bahia on 21 November 1639, comprising 
87 vessels with nearly 5,000 infantry soldiers and 12 artillery pieces for the 
land attack. Although the human contingent was considerably larger if we 
include the crew and the soldiers reserved for the ships, Mascarenhas’ pa-
pers do not confirm the rumour circulating in Recife in November that year 
that 11,000 soldiers were on board.28 Difficulties arose from the outset. The 
north-eastern monsoon was setting in, the convoy was too numerous, the 
ships had different sailing capabilities and some of them were overloaded 
with sugar and dyewood, while insufficient provisions meant a campaign 
would have to be short.
26 CCT, vol. III, 38-41.
27 CCT, vol. I, 308-309 and 318-327.
28 J.H.D. Pereira, ‘A batalha naval de 1640: e outras peripécias da guerra hollandeza no Brasil’ in: 
Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 58/1 (1895) 1-58, 2.
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 Since the north-eastern monsoon impeded direct navigation to Reci-
fe, the ships made for the open sea in order to bypass the winds (volta do 
largo). This delayed the voyage and dispersed the vessels, forcing the arma-
da to cast anchor in Alagoas (some 250 kilometres south of Recife) on 16 
December to wait for the stray ships. While in Alagoas, Torre’s command-
ers gathered fresh intelligence on the opponent’s latest movements. They 
were told by the locals (moradores) that the Dutch were gathering soldiers 
and Indians in the fortifications closer to Recife. They had “1,000 men in 
Pau-Amarelo, 1,000 in Candelária, 500 in Nazaré [Cape of Santo Agostinho]; 
as for Paraíba, the forts were almost empty, while the fort in Cabedelo was 
well entrenched and their garrison reinforced”. The strengthening of these 
outposts’ defence was part of the strategy conceived by Johan Maurits fol-
lowing the news that the Luso-Spanish were planning to disembark troops 
near Recife. Moreover, 400 Dutch and 100 Indians commanded by Major 
Mansfeld were stationed at a recently built fortress “with a moat, trenches 
and stockade without artillery”, four or five miles from the port of Alagoas. 
The moradores complained of the “great tyranny” to which they were sub-
jected by the Dutch and showed the commanders of the armada “legs and 
hands burnt by butter and olive oil” as reprisal for their having provided 
food supplies to the guerrilla fighters of Vidal and Camarão. Since Mansfeld 
had also drained their food supplies and diverted them to Recife, the locals 
urged the Count of Torre to take over this Dutch stronghold. Although mil-
itary action was considered, it was dismissed by Torre’s senior officers on 
the grounds that “the four hundred well entrenched men and led by such 
a commander as Major Mansfeld would hardly surrender in three days”. 
Moreover, such an attack would delay the main operation, while allocating 
men to that mission could turn the “warfare eternal as in Flanders”.29
 While in Alagoas, the Luso-Spanish also gathered fresh information on 
the Dutch naval power and discovered their strategy of seeking to counter 
the landing of troops: “From Recife outwards [Count of Nassan-Siegen] has 
forty ships with the aim of fighting us and from Pau-Amarelo until Can-
delária, he has a great deal of smaller vessels on hold to thwart our land-
ing”.30 Between November and mid-December, merchant ships had indeed 
arrived from the Dutch Republic, thus increasing the number of vessels 
available for battle from 30 to 41.31
29 CCT, vol. I 318-324; Idem, vol. IV, 222.
30 CCT, vol. IV, 223.
31 Guedes, História Naval, 279-280.
TVZ1501_Binnenwerk_proef5.indd   60 4/23/2015   11:19:41 AM
STRugglINg FoR bRAzIl
MüNCh MIRANDA AND SAlvADo 61
 The armada resumed its course on Christmas Eve, once again sailing 
into open sea to bypass the winds. By then it had been reduced to 66 ships 
because not all the stray ships had made it to Alagoas and ended up ei-
ther returning to Salvador or heading back to Iberia. Arriving off the coast 
of Paraíba two weeks later, the vessels then sailed southwards along the 
coast towards Recife, searching for a safe place to put the infantry ashore. 
It should be emphasised that the Count of Torre was well aware that the 
Dutch forts in the northern region of Paraíba were less well-defended, as 
the moradores had informed him in Alagoas. At dawn on 12 January, to the 
north of Olinda, the armada was spotted by Admiral Loos’ fleet when it was 
trying to launch the amphibian operation and transfer troops to smaller 
boats. In the meantime the wind changed and started blowing from the 
south; this thwarted the landing and forced the galleons to look for deep-
er waters. The first running fight between the two fleets broke out on the 
afternoon of that day, between Goiana and Cape Branco, followed by con-
frontations on 13, 14 and 17 January, during which time the ships drifted 
northwards because of opposing winds and the constant need to reposition 
for combat.32 The last of these fights – on 17 January, off Baía Formosa (Rio 
Grande do Norte) – was also the longest and the most violent. After re-
lentlessly engaging the Luso-Spanish ships in combat, the Dutch fleet was 
ultimately able to check their naval power and thwart the feared terrestrial 
offensive. The fate of the Dutch colony was, hence, decided at sea, as Johan 
Maurits had long realised it would be.33
 It is difficult to assess the material and human losses since official re-
ports differ from eyewitness descriptions of the battle, with the latter 
stressing the length and violence of the four fights.34 Official reports from 
the Dutch side refer to 66 dead, including Admiral Loos, and 82 wounded, 
as well as to the sinking of a ship (Geele Sonne). To our knowledge, no report 
systematises the losses on the Luso-Spanish side. The scarce data available 
mention the sinking of a merchant ship and the stranding of the galleon 
Chagas, with the capture of over 200 men, but there is no information on 
the number of human casualties. At the end of the third day of confronta-
tions, a minute of a Council of Captains meeting mentions “many dead and 
a great number of injured” and stress the violence of the fights and particu-
larly that of 14 January, by then “the bloodiest and the fiercest”. The enemy’s 
tenacity was reported to be due to its having orders to “die before letting 
32 Guedes, História Naval, 280-284.
33 Boxer, The Dutch, 94.
34 Barleus, História dos feitos, 181-183; CCT, vol. I, 344-352.
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our troops land”, according to a Dutch prisoner’s testimony.35 The number 
of casualties on both sides is likely to have been higher than indicated in 
the sources and the literature, but cannot be more precisely estimated.
 Lacking water and provisions, both fleets headed out on 18 January in 
search of a safe haven. The Dutch sailed for Rio Grande before returning to 
Recife, while the armada anchored in the bay of Ceará-Mirim on 20 Janu-
ary. By then, it was clear that the mission to recapture Pernambuco could 
not be accomplished. The Count of Torre’s priority was to return to Salva-
dor and ensure its defence, fearing a Dutch attack on the poorly defended 
capital. On the same day, given that the merchant ships that had transport-
ed the troops were preparing to return to Portugal, it was decided that part 
of the infantry would return overland. Besides overcoming a problem of 
transport capacity, this was also a way to mitigate the scanty supplies avail-
able on board.36 In the meantime, on 21 January, the armada split up. Vega 
Bazán, general of the Spanish fleet, refused to sail towards Salvador on the 
grounds that he had received instructions to head for the West Indies and 
to escort the Spanish Treasure Fleet as soon as the Pernambuco endeavour 
was over. In his view, it would be months before the ships could be ready to 
fight the Dutch fleet again. Vega Bazán consequently set sail for Cartagena 
de Indias, taking with him eight ships.37
 On 1 February, 1,430 men led by Luís Barbalho Bezerra landed, as 
planned, in Ceará-Mirim, near the Cape of São Roque. They had been in-
structed to retreat to Salvador and destabilise the hinterland controlled by 
the Dutch by deflecting some of the enemy troops’ attention onto them-
selves. This column was later joined by the contingents led by Vidal and Ca-
marão and that had previously been sent overland to Dutch territory. Over 
the next three months, the men marched some 1,900 kilometres before 
reaching Salvador in May. During their retreat, plantations were destroyed 
and thousands of sugar crates burned, with numerous military casualties.38 
As reprisal for this damage, a Dutch military expedition of 28 ships and 
2,500 men ravaged the region around the Bay of All Saints from late April to 
late May 1640, setting fire to 26 of the 42 sugar mills.39 
35 CCT, vol. I, 344.
36 CCT, vol. IV, 242.
37 CCT, vol. I, 552-555.
38 CTT, vol. I, 439, 452-455, 481-486, 495-496.
39 Wätjen, O domínio, 179; Boxer, The Dutch, 97; Guedes, História Naval, 291.
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Burning of the sugar mills near Salvador, 1640-1641. Etching by Salamon Savery, 
based on Frans Jansz. Post, 1645-1647.
Collection Rijksmuseum Amsterdam
Although no assault on Salvador was attempted, the Luso-Brazilians never-
theless organised a defence, overseen by the Count of Torre. This, however, 
was the final duty he performed as governor-general of Brazil. The disas-
trous outcome of the armada meant he had long lost the support of Count-
duke Olivares and fallen into disgrace. In mid-June, Jorge Mascarenhas, 
Marquis of Montalvão, arrived at Salvador and immediately took over su-
preme command of the colony as viceroy, while the Count of Torre was 
ordered to return to Lisbon, where he was arrested upon arrival.40 As for the 
armada, what was left of it dispersed with the return of its main warships 
to the Iberian Peninsula.
Conclusion
By putting the attack on Recife on hold after crossing the Atlantic, the 
Count of Torre lost the advantage of a surprise attack. From then on, in 
both Bahia and Recife, the two sides concentrated their efforts on organis-
40 Boxer, The Dutch, 97-98; Guedes, História Naval, 291-294.
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ing the expected naval and terrestrial confrontation, while also acquiring 
intelligence on the numbers of soldiers and ships mobilised by the oppo-
nent. The collected papers of Fernando Mascarenhas provide valuable in-
sight into the measures taken to assess the naval and military power of the 
Dutch, as well as their results. After a few months of tapping in the dark, 
the Count of Torre began to receive a regular flow of news on the Dutch 
through agents secretly dispatched to the Pernambuco hinterland. Draw-
ing on feelings of solidarity among Luso-Brazilians living under Dutch rule, 
men such as João Magalhães and André Vidal were effective in gathering 
intelligence, especially on the dispersion of Dutch troops across their coast-
al strongholds. This was of paramount importance when choosing a safe 
location for disembarking the troops as a field campaign was key to the Lu-
so-Spanish strategy. If this information is cross-checked against data from 
Dutch sources, we can see that the Count of Torre and his commanders 
clearly seem to have obtained reliable intelligence and shaped their plan 
for attack accordingly. Ultimately, however, the result of the final confron-
tation did not depend on the availability or quality of the intelligence, but 
was instead decided on the naval front, where the Dutch proved superior. 
Although more powerful in terms of men and ships the armada failed to 
achieve victory at sea and the plan to disembark 5,000 soldiers failed. As a 
result, the reinstatement of Portugal’s sovereignty over Brazil’s north-east 
was delayed until the surrender of Recife in 1654.
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